



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

might be reduced to two, order and liberty. He might well have said with Mirabeau, "I desire order but not the old order," and with Burke, "The only liberty I mean is the liberty connected with order."

Perhaps the most extraordinary instance of Mallet du Pan's political insight is contained in the following lines written in 1781 before the battle of Yorktown :

"Independent or not the United States will emerge from this disastrous war with the hope of profit from it. Their commerce will be free, sooner or later it will embrace the fisheries of all their shores and of the new world and the trade in furs, it will reach to the Antilles, to the Spanish possessions, and even to the East Indies ; a line of communication will be theirs which no European fleet will be able to cut. Nature which has placed the insurgent States in the midst of the Atlantic has so ordered it ; and the moment has arrived when our continent will be forced to admit it."

GEORGE M. DUTCHER.

The Life of Napoleon I. By JOHN HOLLAND ROSE, M.A. (New York : The Macmillan Company. 1901. Two volumes, pp. xvii, 471 ; viii, 547.)

WE have delayed our notice of this important book for several reasons. In the first place, it is long and the style is difficult ; in the second place, it puts forth an important claim as being the first life of Napoleon to include new materials from the British official records ; in the third place, it is the first effort of a British historian at impartiality and self-control in describing the heroic age of modern English history. For these reasons the two stout volumes demand respectful and deliberate examination, and this the reviewer has endeavored to bestow.

The general impression left upon the intelligent reader will probably be one of some weariness, but it will be the weariness of one who has accomplished a good work. Such erudition, such accumulation and orderly arrangement of detail, such marshaling of fact and authority, such patient examination of every source ; all alike testify to Mr. Rose's indefatigable industry and unwearied research. It is safe to say that nothing of value either in the published literature of his subject or in the papers of the London Record Office has escaped him. On the other hand, we are all familiar with the conscientious, laborious, and sometimes invigorating "constitutional" which sedentary men force themselves to take for health. The "constitutional" leads no whither, is a duty to be done and not a pleasure to be enjoyed, strengthens but does not stimulate. The blood does not course freer, the heart beat higher, or the brain devise bright thoughts because of the "constitutional." And we fear that both the reader and the student will lay down these volumes with a sense of wonder that one so learned as the writer could exhibit so little of interest, curiosity, or mastery in discussing the ultimate problems and settling the questions which throng in a life the most brilliant, the most fascinating, and the most productive of weighty consequence among all that have been lived in the nineteenth century. When the author compares Na-

poleon to a python grasping its native rock by the tail in order to hurl its folds whithersoever it may be attacked, we are amazed at a rhetoric and grammar as faulty as the science in the metaphor, but we seem to see the lion by his claw, the somewhat bewildered scholar as uncertain and confused by the dimensions of his task as the masterful but equally uncertain serpent of his comparison. That this is not a solitary indication is shown by the truly British interrogation in praise of Napoleon's charm, "Or if he had gone to the United States, who would have competed with him for the Presidency?"

Fortunately the somewhat turgid rhetoric, of which choice samples might be culled in almost every chapter, seems characteristic of what we may term Mr. Rose's philosophy of Napoleon; his scientific quality is far different from his philosophic. The reader must set aside the rather yeasty general impression of which we have been speaking, and turn to the details of discussion, especially on disputed points. Important as are several of Mr. Rose's novelties, some of them are interwoven with his narrative as a whole and may not be selected for brief examination. Others, however, are fairly complete in themselves. We especially commend to the student the evidence collected from the Record Office that the British government was really privy to substantially all the European complots of the era, in the petty courts of central Europe as well as in the great capitals and in France itself. It is passing strange that our author finds no perfervid language to condemn the cold-blooded conspiracy for the murder of Napoleon in which Cadondal had the backing of English agents. This was not one of the "flaccid eccentricities" to which he refers in his preface, but, as he admits, "one of the most heinous of crimes." Yet such a master of trope and verbiage contents himself with this simple language: surely his admission of what has always been suspected does not avoid the moral effect of his confession of a national crime. Perhaps, however, the effect is the stronger for a simplicity of expression; it certainly would be but for the plaintive excuse "they were all doing it." There is a different tone, we remark, when he sits in judgment upon Napoleon for the execution of the Duc d'Englien, and a tone, we think, which rings with truer indignation. After all, the attempted assassination of Napoleon without even the form of law was an atrocity quite worthy of an age which abounded in atrocious deeds of every degree, but it was also a shocking disgrace to a nation which has boasted its piety and morality as its justification for inaugurating and conducting the Napoleonic wars. Upon the famous question, now become almost academic, as to whether Napoleon was serious in his purpose to invade England or not, we find that no new light is shed and the author manfully acknowledges his indecision. With this we are not content. There is a judicial element in the writing of history, shirk the responsibility as we may. A collection of monographs presenting the case for judgment, even when written by one writer, is not history; an opinion and a sentence calmly and wisely presented are demanded by both students and readers. Mr. Rose says in one paragraph that had all Napoleon's com-

plex dispositions in the northern ports worked smoothly he would certainly have made a dash at London, but that, awaiting only an excuse to avoid the enterprise, he found that excuse in Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz and wheeled his legions eastward to prosecute the alluring alternative of continental conquest. It is certain that Napoleon always had two possibilities in preparation, but it is equally certain that of the two in this case that for the invasion of England was poorly studied, destitute of expert support, fantastic in its theatrical quality, and devoid of the Napoleonic characteristics, while the possibility actually adopted was thoroughly and minutely studied, had every mark of a solid purpose with firm reality, and was triumphantly executed. What seems to us conclusive, however, is the fact that the invasion of England was the secular and ever effective pretext of every successive French government to arouse French patriotism, open the French purse, and evade criticism of internal affairs. Napoleon was using the old device on his own scale: simultaneously he was busy behind the screen working out two stupendous problems, the subjugation of France for himself, and the subjugation of continental Europe for France. We believe it to be the most salient weakness in Napoleon's character that he utterly failed to apprehend the value of sea power. Visions of its bearing on imperialism he got occasionally, but his first concern was land power, the one weapon of which he was a consummate master. Certainly there are many indications that at this very moment he would gladly have considered (as a year earlier he had openly suggested) a partition of world-empire between himself and Great Britain, with the latter as overlord of the seas. Spurned by the western power, he turned later to propose something similar to Russia.

This brings us to consider Mr. Rose's treatment of the renewal of war by England and the rupture of the treaty made at Amiens. We choose this inverse order because it is easier sometimes to reason backward chronologically than to anticipate. When Napoleon suggested to the English ambassador the division of world-empire with Great Britain, he was playing the game of world-politics strictly according to British rules. Neither of the gamesters felt the slightest respect for international law, and the English ministry was entirely complacent about every move of its antagonist as long as the principle of compensations was admitted and practised. But when it was seen that Napoleon's interventions contemplated a permanent seat of French power in Holland, and his compensations were not inclusive of a British garrison at the Cape of Good Hope or of a British occupation of Malta, England regretted her renunciation of interest on the continent and appealed to international law. The Whigs eagerly seized on any pretext for a blow at their party opponents, and the cleavage of public opinion in Great Britain gave the ministry some anxiety. Addington therefore grew suddenly bellicose, and the instructions given by him to a new ambassador selected to beard and infuriate Napoleon are as calm, specious, and clear as if written under the inspiration of our present-day tribunal at The Hague. Simultaneously, however, the cabinet began preparations for war and laid down an ulti-

matum. The sport of diplomacy was much to the First Consul's liking and on Lord Whitworth's arrival he pursued it with zest. But when the situation grew strained and war became probable the First Consul hesitated. The treaty of Amiens had been negotiated by able men, and he had observed its letter with no genuine remonstrance from the other party. It is aside from the question to instance the conduct of Russia, Prussia, and Spain in regard to the treaty as nullifying its provisions. The treaty was nullified by the British retention of Malta, and this was admitted when Whitworth was instructed to suggest an equivalent. We think it true that Napoleon cherished oriental designs, while his brothers hoped for the retention of Louisiana in the west. Why not? There was ample highway space along the Mediterranean for both England and France, and ample room for both in Asia. But there was no equivalent to Malta: it must be neutral or in joint occupation. Napoleon's colonial plans were superb, as grandiose as those of Great Britain. To realize them he needed peace for extensive preparation, and an agreement with England. His antagonist would permit neither, and in spite of one hesitating concession after another—the transfer of Malta to Russia, an English tenure of the island for two or three years, Otranto in exchange for Malta—Whitworth played his part to the end, and England declared war. Perhaps at this late day we may not blame any one nation for distrust of another, but this is quite as applicable to Napoleonic France as to Georgian England. If Napoleon did not seriously contemplate invading England even in 1804, he surely had desired to win her, as far as consonant with his own advantage, throughout the peace period subsequent to the treaty of Amiens; the responsibility for the breach of that treaty must rest with the nation which, not content with a share, desired the entire control of the sea.

Certain other instances of the same kind can easily be found, even by the casual reader. Our author feels sure it was impossible to have found for Napoleon a "less unpleasant place of detention" than St. Helena, and in the final chapter there is a justification of Sir Hudson Lowe which is almost a eulogium. Yet it is a thankless task to pursue a subject already set forth, we think, with sufficient emphasis. Clearly Mr. Rose with his ostentatious frankness has thought to disarm criticism and excuse anew the blameworthy sides of English politics in the early nineteenth century. Nowhere does he avow his party sympathies, but the Whigs of his period would have had little patience with his Tory apologia as set forth in these volumes.

The other side of our task is entirely pleasant. For finished workmanship we have only to mention the treatment of Toulon, where full justice is done to both sides and to all persons, the discussion of the events known as the "day of the Sections," the claims of Augereau to have rescued the first Italian campaign from disaster, and other topics, of which, should we mention all, the list would not be short. In every matter where patriotism is not a controlling force Mr. Rose is thoroughly equipped and entirely reliable: he holds the balance freely, as between

the continental powers, though his treatment of Austria in the matter of Napoleon's second marriage does not adequately deal with the baseness of both Francis and his daughter. We note his conclusion that the real turn of Napoleon's fortunes was during the first Saxon campaign, wherein the armistice of Poischwitz proved fatal to ultimate military success. The point is well made and the proof is conclusive.

Finally, it is noteworthy that a writer who is not a military specialist has known how to thread his way firmly and skilfully through the mazes of Napoleon's strategy and tactics. For the intelligent reader there is ample discussion of all the great events which were the basis of the Emperor's strength. There is a fine exclusion of unnecessary detail, and a concise statement of important outline. We venture to think that the campaigns of Marengo and Waterloo are both delineated with magisterial power. It may be objected that there is an absence of imaginative and thrilling description in Mr. Rose's battle scenes, and a consequent lack of the effect which is alone the ideal truth of literature. These volumes make no claim, we must repeat, to high literary quality. They are something quite different, the careful work of an erudite scholar and investigator, marked in the statement of facts by an exaggerated simplicity and calm. The quelling rhetoric is reserved to bring out here and there at intervals the pent up emotions of the author, which are often those of a gallant but rather desperate knight coping with a task almost superhuman in its dimensions. No wonder. It is exactly this attitude of mind which is Mr. Rose's greatest strength.

A History of the Peninsular War. By CHARLES OMAN. Vol. I.

From the Treaty of Fontainebleau to the Battle of Corunna.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1902. Pp. xvi, 656.)

Les Guerres d'Espagne sous Napoléon. Par E. GUILLON. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie. 1902. Pp. v, 364.)

IN reviewing Napoleon's wonderful work as a captain we find the war in the Iberian peninsula from 1808 to 1813, while less important because the Emperor was there for but a brief period, yet by no means the least interesting. To Anglo-Saxons it is ever memorable as being the field where our cousins of the British army had almost the only chance to display their courage and constancy; for it was at sea that Great Britain dealt her heaviest blows at Napoleon, as it was by her subsidies that she most heartily contested his continental system. Except as a drain of men at a period when France could no longer stand the drain (and the Peninsular War cost France three hundred thousand men), Spain had less influence than any other extended field in the grand total of land operations. But it was the theater where the second of England's great soldiers, Wellington, played his part; and though a proper perspective makes Spain but one scene in the vast Napoleonic drama, yet the conflict loses not its military nor its human interest; and to all English-speaking peoples it is a tale which may always be twice